This paper examines externalities of safeguard protection. We identify a panel of 2,241
Introduction
In March 2002, the US government under initiative of domestic industry imposed safeguard protection on imports of certain steel products. The WTO permits the use of administered trade policy actions to limit imports of goods that seriously injure or threat to injure domestic industry. Safeguard measures (SM), together with antidumping (AD), have become the prevalent instruments for enforcing new import restrictions. In this paper, we examine the effect of US safeguard protection on mark-ups of European steel producers of subject products.
We expect mark-ups of European steel producers to be affected through two main channels, cost and demand side. Directly entering its profit function, a safeguard tariff raises the costs of the European exports of subject products to the US. When not perfectly passed through to the US price, European steel exporters partially absorb the tariff. Turning to the demand side, we expect a negative effect of import penetration on mark-ups of European steel producers.
Indirectly, a safeguard tariff may deflect trade, increasing import competition in subject products in the European and third markets. Using the Roeger (1995) methodology, our estimation results indicate a negative effect of US safeguards on price mark-ups of EU steel producers. Markups are decreasing with import penetration and the level of the safeguard tariffs. Controlling for unobservable firm heterogeneity with fixed effects, these results are robust to alternative specifications.
This paper contributes to the literature on trade protection and firm related aspects. We distinguish between two main streams in the literature to motivate our empirical findings. The first type of studies look at the implications of administered trade protection for domestic industries or firms. The second, refer to the externalities of trade protection. Furthermore, the implications of antidumping studies are relevant for this paper, since both safeguard measures and antidumping duties carry similar economic implications for industries. Following different objectives, safeguard and antidumping measures are likely to restrict trade and raise mark-ups of protected firms. While the purpose of antidumping protection lies behind sanctioning free trade violations, safeguard protection aims at providing space for adjustment and technological catch-up within industries 1 . US industries filed in the eighties more antidumping than safe-guard petitions and the success rate for antidumping (63 percent) has shown to be higher than for safeguard (26 percent) petitions 2 . More recent literature provides the evidence that some countries are increasing their usage of safeguards as well 3 . It suggests that either strictness of injury criteria (Baldwin, 1988) or retaliation threat (Blonigen and Bown, 2003) condition the decision of which measure to be imposed. Following Hartigan (2002) , the filing decision depends largely on procedural differences between AD and safeguard measures. Before filing for protection, firms will take into account the duration, the level of duties, and difficulties to obtain protection. Filing for safeguard protection must meet the serious injury condition, which is much higher standard than material injury condition under AD legislation. Firms will consider filing for safeguard protection only if the expected value of protection is higher relative to AD protection. Feenstra (1995) and Gawande and Krishna (2003) and Lenway et al. (1990) provide evidence that mark-ups may change due to altered market structure leading to abnormal returns.
There has been relatively little work done to explore the extent of externalities due to administered trade protection. Unilaterally imposed safeguard measures temporarily disrupt the multilateral framework including trading agreements previously negotiated between the importing and exporting Members of the WTO. Safeguard protection is imposed on all imports regardless of source. As such, it generates more externalities for non-protected markets than to obtain, because it requires the approval of the President, whereas antidumping protection is approved by Department of Commerce. 2 Hansen and Prusa (1995) find that the US safeguard measures from 1980 to 1988 decreased trade volumes by an average of 34 per cent. Moreover, over the same period, they find that trade volumes fell by an average of only eleven percent when the government imposed an antidumping duty. 3 Bown and Crowley (2005) show that the United States imposed only seven safeguard measures in 1980-1994, while in 1994-1999 they imposed five safeguard measures. 4 The evidence on decreasing mark-ups due to trade liberalization is documented in Levinsohn (1993) , Harrison (1994) , Feenstra (1995) , Krishna and Mitra (1998) , and Gawande and Krishna (2003) . The impacts of trade liberalization on price mark-ups through the elasticity of demand have been modelled extensively in the literature under several assumptions, e.g. on substitution between foreign and domestic goods (Devarajan and Rodrik, 1991) , type of protection (Bhagwati, 1978) , variety of goods (Krugman, 1979) , market concentration (Helpman and Krugman, 1989) , collusive outcomes (Staiger and Wolak, 1989; Prusa, 1994; Vandenbussche and Veuglers, 1999) . AD protection. Bown and Crowley (2005) address the impact of one country's use of an import restricting trade policy on a foreign country's exports to third markets. They show that US import restrictions both depress Japanese export flows to US and deflect them to third countries.
The intent of US safeguards was to provide incentives for the domestic industry to renovate technologies and gain the competitive edge. Miyagiwa and Ohno (1995) find that safeguards provide an incentive for protected firms to innovate quickly only if the cost of the new technology is falling over time and the termination date for safeguard protection is credibly enforced by foreign retaliation. Furthermore, Crowley (2002) suggests that a non-discriminatory safeguard tariff can accelerate technology adoption by a domestic import-competing firm, but will slow down technology adoption by a foreign firm. However for firms far from the technological frontier, safeguard protection can lower present value of exit costs by spreading them over longer periods instead of allowing for catch-up (Hartigan, 2005) .
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly overviews US and EU steel industry and presents the event surrounding the imposition of US safeguard protection. In Section 3 we present a simple theoretical framework to provide the intuition for the empirical analysis. Section 4 discusses earlier literature on estimating mark-ups and develops the empirical model based on the Roeger (1995) approach. Further, we describe data and interpret estimation results. We conclude with a brief summary of our results and extensions for future work.
The Steel Industry
One year before US safeguard protection, the world manufacturers were on average exploiting only 77 percent of their capacities and several US integrated manufacturers went bankrupt. Less efficient US steel producers were selling below their production costs and in 2001 experienced on average $57 loss per one tonne of steel manufactured. There are two types of steel producers in the US steel sector, integrated and non-integrated producers or minimills. The latter are flexible and cost effective small producers, specialized in certain products that use newer technologies, enabling higher productivity than integrated producers have. On the other hand, there are large labour and capital-intensive integrated firms producing a broad range of products, using outdated technologies and employing unionized labour force, therefore being cost inefficient and less productive than competitive industries. The level of average production costs for integrated producers has been much higher than for the largest US steel importers. In fact, their efficiency level remained on average rather constant. By contrast, minimills increased their production efficiency by almost 10 percent from 1998 to 2001 and were even more efficient than most of US steel importers (Worldsteel, 2005) .
Minimills were in their growth stage, having a five times larger domestic market share than two decades ago, while integrated producers were in their retrenchment state, loosing their domestic market share from about 50 to 25 percent in the same period. Since the latter are large employers that frequently file petitions to the ITC and lobby for favorable legislative restrictions (Lenway et al., 1990) . Although the primary goal of trade restrictions regards the maintenance of domestic producers' competitive edge, the integrated producers have remained largely noncompetitive despite $15 billion "green-light" subsidies received in the last two decades.
EU steel industry has since the eighties undergone a complete restructuring 5 . A market- In order to understand differences between US and EU industries, it is helpful to obtain further insights from the manufacturing process. Subject products can be manufactured in blast furnaces, basic oxygen or open-heart furnaces, and electric furnaces using either scrap steel or iron ore and coal. By contrast to US integrated producers, the competitive US minimills and EU producers mainly apply newer technologies, i.e. processing scrap steel in electric furnaces, that are less capital and labour intensive and therefore allow for higher cost efficiency and productivity.
An important distinction between the US and the EU steel industry is that the latter has 5 The industry consolidation reached its highest momentum in 2006. Mittal Steel anticipates the industry will be in the future dominated by three global steel players, producing more than 100 million tonnes annually. On present trends, Mittal Steel will surely be one of the three. Once the acquisition of the US International Steel Group is realized, Mittal Steel will be the largest steel producer in the world, with an annual crude steel capacity of 63 million tonnes, and Arcelor will be in second place with 45 million tonnes (EC, 2006 The objective was to facilitate adjustment to higher unanticipated imports due to GATT/WTO liberalization agreement and enhance the competitive edge of domestic steel industry that had experienced substantial losses leading to several bankruptcies. The political-economic reasoning for safeguards is in providing governments a means to address their redistributive motives or to demonstrate favor to politically preferred interest groups if those groups have more power than those harmed by the potential use of safeguards (Bown and Crowley, 2005) . As a response to the US trade policy action, the European Commission (EC) filed a complaint at the WTO and after a while negotiated the retaliation power 8 . As the US steel industry recovered and retaliation threats of Co-complainants became unsustainable, the Bush administration dropped its support for safeguard protection. Although the protection was initially scheduled to expire 6 Producing 193 million tonnes of crude steel, the EU accounts for 18% of world production. China is the larger producer with 272 million tonnes (26% of world production), followed by Japan with 113 million tonnes and the US with 99 million tonnes. 7 Certain prerequisites are required for imposition of safeguard measures: first, the injury determination, and second, the determination of surge in imports either absolutely, relatively to the market or its consumption, unanticipated, or non-attributed, as bad industry performance is due to depression. 8 The retaliation power is based upon nullification and impairment of expected benefits from trade agreement.
after three years, the WTO facilitated its termination by the end of 2003 9 .
Safeguard measures took form of tariffs ranging from 8 to 30 percent on 9 categories of steel products as well as a tariff-rate quota on slabs 10 . Table 1 describes subject products analyzed in this paper. The table shows the product, the classification of the product within Harmonized
Tariff Schedule (HTS) 11 , the tariff level imposed in two years of safeguard protection, and the average import market share of the subject product as a percentage of total US imports of steel. The highest tariff levels of 30 and 24 percent were imposed on imports of products that represented the largest share in US imports, i.e. flat steel and slabs and different types of bars and rods. Nearly two thirds of US total imports were limited by safeguard protection. We report US import market shares at the beginning of our data sample in 1996 and draw comparisons with a year before and at the end of protection.
There is a decreasing trend of about 13 percentage points in all subject products with respect to total US imports. In particular this is due to a decline in the share of flat steel products and [Insert Table 1 here]
The following figure reveals that not only the share of imported subject products in total US imports decreased, but the latter significantly declined in 2002 as well. The magnitude of decline is partially due to a large share of subject products in total US imports of steel. Figure 1 graphically presents the evolution of US imports of subject products from the rest of the world. 9 Safeguard protection is typically imposed for the period of four years with possible four-year extension. 1 0 Slabs refer to cold-and hot-rolled carbon steel plates and sheets. On average, trade in subject products represented roughly 25 million tonnes in the past decade.
[Insert Figure 1 here] Two observations come clear from the above figure based on the US ITC trade data (ITC, 2005). Firstly, there was a declining trend in imports since 1998, which questions the fairness of US safeguard protection. Secondly, a sharp decline of US imports of subject products in 2003 below its eight-year value was followed by fast recovery afterwards. Although the trend is largely determined by flat steel products, it is clear that safeguards decreased imports of all subject products. Both sharp downturn and recovery imply trade rerouting in these products.
This finding motivates our analysis, implying that mark-ups of European producers of subject products may fall after 2002, firstly, due to decreased import market shares of subject products in the US and secondly, due to trade rerouting in subject products introducing increased competition in the European market for steel. We will consider that European steel producers could have found it profitable to reroute their exports to non-US markets due to US protection.
Theoretical Framework
An economic analysis allows a better understanding of the basic nature of administered protection that affects market power of foreign firms. It provides key insights on the effect of US safeguard tariffs on mark-ups of European producers. To illustrate this effect, we base our theoretical considerations on modification of existing reciprocal dumping model by Brander (1981) and Brander and Krugman (1983) . The novelty of our approach is that it introduces a safeguard tariff on each unit of shipments, denoted by τ . This simple model does not intend to provide an exhaustive alternative to existing theoretical models explaining the effects of protection. In contrast, our aim is to point out that US safeguard protection matters for the European producer of a like product and it is likely to adversely affect its profits.
Suppose for example that an US and an EU firm produce one subject product with the same unit variable cost c. Consider that they are located in their home countries, namely the US and the EU. These countries represent each other's largest trading partners in this subject product, that is by definition of the "like-product" rule considered as a homogenous product 12 .
Imperfect competition generates trade in this product. While competing in a Cournot fashion in shipments of the subject product, firms face iceberg transport costs, so that the marginal cost of exports is c g , where 0 ≤ g ≤ 1. It is essential, that US and EU markets are segmented, so firms set prices independently in each market.
The European firm produces the output x for the European and the output x * for the US market, denoted by asterisk * . The US firm produces the output y for the European and the output y * for the US market. Each firm sells its output at price P in the EU and at price P * in the US. Each firm maximizes its profits with respect to output sold in each market taking into account shipments of the other competitor, that is:
where p(Q) and p * (Q * ) are the inverse demand functions in EU and US markets, respectively.
The first order conditions for profit maximization imply:
3)
The European firm's market share in US market is defined by σ * = x * Q * and the US firm's market share in EU market is defined by σ = y Q , where Q and Q * denote total sales at output prices P in the EU and P * in the US. Defining the price elasticity of demand with ε = − P Q ∂Q ∂P , the best reply functions for both firms in the US market can be implicitly expressed as:
and analogously best reply functions can be derived for the EU market. The above equations imply that the European firm needs to consider the tariff imposed on each unit of its output shipped to the US. The variable cost of tariff thus enters its profit function. The solution of best reply functions is the trade equilibrium 13 .
Comparative Statics for a Safeguard Tariff 1 3 See Appendix for a more detailed description of this model.
This simple theoretical framework provides us with intuition that the US safeguard tariff will adversely affect the European firm's mark-up. Rewriting best reply functions and solving Equations (3.4) and (3.5) for price levels and market shares with respect to demand elasticities yields expressions for the Nash equilibrium market shares of the EU and the US firm in each other's market:
The equilibrium prices in both markets can then be expressed as:
The price in the US market will exceed the EU price due to the tariff τ imposed on imports.
Under free trade both prices would be equal and firms would have sold equivalent shares in exporting markets. By contrast under US safeguard protection, the EU firm will sell less in the US market than the US firm in the EU market, i.e. σ * < σ. Each firm will export as long as it can charge a price that covers the variable cost of each unit shipped. There is an anti-competitive effect of the safeguard tariff, assuming that price elasticity of demand ε * falls as the European firm's market share in the US decreases.
The model suggests two channels through which the mark-up of the EU firm is affected, through import penetration and trade costs. We consider the vector of mark-ups, µ that consists of the mark-up attributed to the output for the EU market, µ = P c , and the mark-up attributed to the output exported to the US, µ * = P * c . Let us define the equilibrium import penetration ratio as the share of EU imports over total EU output, that is m = y x+ y . Thus, the mark-up of the EU firm can be expressed as:
c−gτ
Intuitively, the EU firm exhibits a lower mark-up attributed to its exports due to trade costs, g and τ . Equation (3.8) leads to Proposition 1.
Proposition 1
In the Cournot equilibrium with the EU and the US firms exporting the subject product in each other markets, where the US market is restricted by a safeguard tariff, is the mark-up of the EU firm:
1. decreasing with import penetration; 2. decreasing with the level of the safeguard tariff.
Proof.
1.
We bring this intuition to the data to examine the relation between prices and marginal costs. If European steel producers absorbed part of the tariff, we expect the safeguard tariff to be imperfectly passed through to US price for subject products leading to a decline in µ * , the mark-up associated with exports to the US. Furthermore, the safeguard tariff will adversely affect the European firm's profits:
The negative effect of tariff on European firm's profit will depend on the elasticity of demand in the US and the size of its exports there. Thus, the European firm could preserve the level of its mark-ups, if it were able to reroute its exports to non-protected markets. Our theoretical framework provides intuition for the empirical analysis in the next section. Using comparative statics we expect both import penetration and the safeguard tariff to have a negative effect on the mark-up of EU firm 14 . Intuitively, the EU firm faces larger costs per unit of output shipped than under free trade, so that the US tariff shifts the best response function of the EU firm inwards in the US market and thus diminishes market power of the European firm.
Empirical Analysis
In this section we look for empirical evidence that could confirm predictions above. Earlier literature proposes different approaches to estimate firm price mark-ups. Our methodology is based upon the Roeger (1995) methodology. This methodology is well suited for our firm-level data and was before successfully applied by Konings and Vandenbussche (2005 in the Hall approach, the measurement error is counter-cyclic and productivity growth tends to be pro-cyclic, leading to downward biased estimates of price mark-ups.
On the other hand, one could think of applying the Bresnahan (1989) approach that uses the New Empirical Industrial Organisation techniques to estimate price mark-ups through the responsiveness of prices to changes in demand elasticities and cost components. That structural approach has been already applied in earlier empirical research 15 . But since it requires detailed data on unit prices and quantities to estimate demand elasticities of particular industry it is inappropriate for our study. Our research is limited by company accounts data that do not include these figures.
Roeger (1995) and Olley and Pakes (1996) suggest models that go beyond the Hall approach.
Olley and Pakes (1996) successfully overcome a simultaneity problem generated by the relationship between productivity and demand for production factors. Their model circumvents the selection and simultaneity biases by developing a semi-parametric estimator for the production function parameters within the behavioral framework 16 . Because their approach requires longer time spans and can be applied only to firms with positive capital investments, it is less appropriate for our case.
Roeger (1995) develops a model that requires neither instrumentation nor deflators for output and production factor prices. His model is based upon the Solow (1957) model that has shown that the change of total factor productivity can be measured from observed data directly for a constant returns technology with the additional assumption of perfect competition 17 
The Empirical Model
We employ the Roeger methodology that allows direct estimation of price mark-ups to estimate whether US safeguard protection had a negative impact on mark-ups of European steel producers 18 . Similar to Hall (1988) and Konings and Vandenbussche (2005) , we consider a
M it are capital, labour and material inputs, and E it is a shift variable representing changes in productivity efficiency for a firm i at time t.
Using the Solow residual, Hall measures the productivity growth as the output growth net weighted production factors growth, described as:
where small letters refer to logarithms and the shares of labor and material costs in total sales (P it Q it ) of firm i at time t are denoted by α Lit =
FLitLit
PitQit and α Mit =
FMitMit
PitQit with F and P representing input and output prices. The novelty of his paper is to show that under imperfect competition, the sum of input shares per unit is below one due to the existence of a mark-up term. Decomposition of a mark-up and technology component is therefore a crucial step in the Roeger approach and can be expressed in the following form:
where
is a Lerner index for a firm i at time t. The right hand side is decomposed in a mark-up and a pure technology component. The relationship between price and marginal cost is established through the coefficient λ it that is directly related to the mark-up over marginal
, where ξ it denotes the sum of input costs in the firm's cost function and equals 1 under constant returns to scale, as assumed in Roeger (1995) 19 . Price-based or dual Solow residual (SRP it ) is then defined from this relationship between marginal cost and output price and can be expressed in the following form:
where F Kit denotes price of capital employed in the production function. The innovation of Roeger (1995) stems from using SRP it to substitute for a change in productivity efficiency of a firm i at time t, i.e. △e it in Equation (4.2). Similar to Konings and Vandenbussche (2005) we 1 9 Roeger shows that the change in marginal cost is a weighted average of changes in input prices (F Iit ) with respect to their relative cost shares in the firm's cost function (φ Iit ), accounting for the change in technology (e it ), i.e. △c it = φ Iit △F Iit − △e it . Hence, c it = P it (1 − λ it ) ⇐⇒
obtain the expression:
where u it represents the difference between measurement errors in SR it and SRP it and equals zero, since both forms are assumed to have the same unobservable productivity term.
Since Lerner index under constant returns to scale is defined as λ it = Pit−cit Pit
, we rewrite Equation (4.4) to directly estimate price mark-up (µ it ) term:
where △Ω Lit and △Ω Mit represent the growth rates in labor and material costs per value of capital costs in firm i at time t 20 . Our core model is then specified as:
In line with the Roeger approach that the growth rate in output is explained by the growth rate in inputs times mark-up term, our left-hand side variable (△Y it ) represents growth rate in sales per value of capital for a firm i at time t. The right hand side explanatory variable (△X it ) stands for a vector of the growth rate in inputs weighted by their shares in total sales.
Description of Data
The data used in this study are the annual company accounts data compiled from Amadeus organized by the Bureau van Dijk. The data cover the industry of basic metals across eleven EU-15 countries for the period 1995-2004. We focus our study on those firms that have reported their primary activity in this sector. The additional annual data on control variables, i.e. real GDP growth rates and product-level trade data, are downloaded from Ameco and Eurostat.
Industry selection was guided by the official statements from the White House Press on the US Steel Products Proclamation from March 2002. This information is used for identifying the products subject to US safeguard protection. From this source, we obtain necessary information about the type, the levelm and the length of safegaurd tariffs. We used the services of the Tariff Information Center to classify protected products according to the 8-digit HTS of the US. Under Chapter 99 within the Section XXII on Special Temporary Legislation, we identify subject products and match them with products specified in the Section XV on Base Metals and Articles of Base Metal product descriptions. The majority of activities involved in the production of subject products can be classified under the 2-digit HTS 72 code and the minority of activities, i.e. those involved in the production of certain welded tubular products, under the HTS 73 code. Using the convergence key between HTS and Prodcom classifications we identify groups of activities at the 4-digit Nace Rev.1.1 level. We denote affected firms as those that are engaged in production of subject products.
Each firm in Amadeus has a trade description that allows for identifying activities pertinent to production of subject products. The variables used in our econometric model are the following.
The firm level operating revenue in each year provided in Amadeus is used to proxy the sales variable. For the value of capital we use the book value of tangible fixed assets for each firm in each year. The labour costs reported in Amadeus proxy the wage bill variable. Material costs variable is simply proxied by the firm-level total material costs consisting of the factor price multiplied by the quantity of materials. We constructed the capital intensity variable using the book value of tangible fixed assets for each firm in each year over the corresponding book value of total assets. The country-level real GDP growth rates, real long term interest rates, and the price index of investment goods are obtained from the Ameco database from the ECFIN department at the European Commission.
Our firm-level data covers 2,241 firms, among which we distinguish between less and more diversified firms. Firms that do not report any secondary activity are referred to as singleproduct firms. These are likely to have less diversified production than multi-product firms.
Multi-product firms by contrast refer to firms reporting at least one activity under the secondary Nace code. Table 2 presents the structure of treated industry and some descriptive statistics including main indicators of the average firm's performance, size, and productivity.
[Insert Table 2 here]
The first pass at the data suggests there might be differences in the responsiveness of firms to the US safeguard tariff. The first column describes the number of affected firms in the Roeger specification. Our dataset consists of over two thirds of single-product firms that on average exhibit a bit lower degree of competition for their products than multi-product firms 21 . Regarding the structure of the industry, only 19 percent of multi-product firms are active in directly affected industry of basic metals. Multi-product firms predominantly active in basic metals industry were on average larger in terms of sales and employment (L) and performed better, gaining higher returns on assets (ROA) at similar value added per worker (V A/L). An interesting observation is that 21 percent of multi-product firms were active in non-manufacturing sector, i.e. engaged in financial services, retail sector, and others. These were on average among the largest firms.
Descriptive statistics on price cost-margin (Lerner index) of an average firm reveal an interesting pattern that motivates our empirical model. 
Results

Basic Specification
Our preferred econometric approach is fixed effects model that allows controlling for unobservable firm-specific fixed effects 24 . As noted above, we estimate separately mark-ups for each group of European producers of subject products by a log-linear model, controlling for industry and year specific effects. The Roeger approach allows us to directly estimate mark-ups of an average European steel producer of subject products. In our basic empirical specification, we estimate whether there was a statistically significant change in mark-ups in the period of US 2 2 According to the EU trade statistics, were Japan (34.8 million tonnes), the EU-15 (31.8 mt), Russia (30.4 mt), Ukraine (28.2 mt), and China (20.0 mt) the largest steel exporting countries in 2004. The largest steel importing countries at that time were China (33.2 mt), US (32.8 mt), the EU-15 (30.4 mt), and South Korea (17.7mt). There has been a rapid growth in steel production elsewhere in the world, leading to a sharp decline in the EU's traditional trade surplus in iron and steel products. The EU steel imports have increased from 14.5 million tonnes in 1997 to 24.6 million tonnes in 2002. 2 3 In August 2003, agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters between the European Community and the Russian Federation was reached, establishing a double-checking system without quantitative limits in respect of the export of certain steel products from the Russian Federation to the European Community (EC 22003A0828(01) ). 2 4 Following the results of a Hausman test we prefer a fixed effects model over a random effects model, although our results did not alter much using different specifications. The F-test indicated that fixed effects were significant in all four model specifications. The selection bias is less of an issue, since mark-ups until 2002 did not exhibit a significant upward or downward trend. In all econometric models we include industry and year dummies. All model specifications include controls for firm size and industry concentration by total sales or employment and Herfindahl-Hirschman index. 
Our explained variable, ∆Y it , represents output growth per value of capital. Our composite explanatory variable, ∆X it , includes growth of nominal inputs weighted by factor shares in sales for each firm i at time t. The results for each group of European steel producers are reported in Table 3 25 . In the first column we present our explanatory variables, controlling for business cycles by using real GDP growth rates to proxy for country-level shifts of demand. In the second column we report results of our first model specification (1), where we estimate mark-ups jointly for all European producers of subject products. The coefficient µ 1 refers to the level of mark-ups of European firms. The coefficient is statistically different from 1 and implies that the output price exceeded the marginal cost by around 37 percent.
[Insert Table 3 here]
The coefficient µ 2 is of our main concern, since it denotes a decrease in average mark-ups after imposition of US safeguards. We interact our composite variable ∆X it with a dummy where we consider multi-and single-product firms, we also find highly significant decline in their mark-ups.
The level of mark-ups for multi-product firms (2) is on average larger than for single-product firms during 1995-2004. Further, multi-product firms experienced on average a larger decrease in their mark-ups than less diversified firms (3). Multi-product firms benefit from scale economies as they spread fixed costs over a larger number of units, thus operating on the downward sloping part of the average cost curve. Referring to Table 2 , around 80 percent of multi-product firms 2 5 We construct our capital variable in line with Konings and Vandenbussche (2005) as user cost of capital multiplied by its nominal value. We define the user value of capital as Z jt (rt + δ it ), where we consider a countrylevel price index of investment goods, Z jt , a long-term real interest rate rt at time t, and depreciation of capital δ it of the average rate of 10 per cent. We simulated the sensitivity of mark-ups towards different depreciation rates, price indices of investment goods, and real interest rates. Allowing for up to 5 per cent changes, our point estimates vary within the range of 1 per cent, without altering the signs of estimated coefficients. 2 6 The real GDP growth rate in our data lies around 2 per cent.
are active in other than basic metal sectors. Their presence in further fabricated steel and retail sectors, allows them to charge mark-ups associated with product characteristics. Exploiting variation in own-and cross-product demand elasticities, enables mark-up differentials between different types of firms 27 .
Safeguard Tariffs, Import Penetration and Trade Diversion to the US, conditional on tariff levels. Secondly, we consider increased competition in the EU market due to import penetration. The extended model is specified as:
We construct import penetration, m kt , and export intensity, x kt , in the following manner:
χ kt , and [Insert Table 4 here]
The results presented in Table 4 indicate that the average mark-up of both multi-and singleproduct firms is negatively associated with import penetration and export intensity to the US, conditional on the tariff levels. Mark-ups are shown to be decreasing with the level of the safeguard tariff. For the sample of all firms (1), we indicate that a percentile change in tariffs leads to a statistically highly significant decline in mark-ups of 3 percents. While both multiproduct (2) and single-product firms (3) industries. Differences in trading costs explain a great part in variation of openness to trade across industries. 2 9 Tariffs range from 7 to 30 per cent and are imposed on each unit of subject product imported by the US. Thus, both multi-and single-product firms face equal increase in unit costs of traded steel.
3 0 Single-product firms are narrowly specialized in production of certain subject products. They face fiercer competition at home and earn lower mark-ups than multi-product firms that exploit economies of scale. Deflected trade in steel during 2002-2003 may have increased demand elasticities in third markets, reaping off a part of single-product firms' market share and consequently lowering their mark-ups relative to previous years. By contrast, multi-product firms reallocate their international portfolio with a greater ease, and countervail losses with the US by charging higher mark-ups elsewhere. After 2002, diversified multi-product firms faced increased competition represented in particular by deflected Russian steel, likely cheaper and qualitatively differentiated from European steel. Having broader portfolio, multi-product firms are less dependent on their international markets and are able to adjust mark-up levels faster than single-product firms.
was scheduled for 4 years for 10 groups of subject products. Secondly, the effect compounds different ongoing trade and competition policies in the steel sector during that time. Even though safeguard protection has been terminated already after 2 years, were 21 of these products subject to ongoing US antidumping and countervailing duties, scheduled for 5 years. There may be an overriding effect of antidumping and antitrust policies in the US and the EU market that have further exerted a chilling effect on mark-ups of European steel producers 31 .
The estimated change in mark-ups represents a lower bound value. Firstly, we do not observe the share of sales of a firm i at time t dedicated to exports in our data. Further identification of export intensive and export less intensive firms would add largely to the robustness of our results. Secondly, total sales in Amadeus are reported at 4-digit activity-level and not at 8-digit product-level. To circumvent these problems, we could estimate product specific markups using trade data in our future work 32 . Finally, in presence of increasing returns to scale, estimates of mark-up changes are likely to be downward biased due to constant returns to scale assumption. Interacting our composite regressor ∆X it with a dummy variable SM, taking 1 in 2002 and 0 otherwise, we find even larger and a highly significant decrease in mark-ups in model specifications (1), (2), and (3). Assuming constant returns to scale, the Roeger method leads to overestimated mark-up levels and underestimated mark-up changes in case of increasing returns to scale 33 . If the unobservable term u it in Equation (4.4) would cancel out, we would be able to explain all variation in data. However despite the high goodness of fit, about 10 percent of the variance remains unexplained in all model specifications.
Counterfactual Sample
In order to ensure that mark-ups of producers of subject products decreased due to safeguard protection and not due to some phenomenon in the European manufacturing sector, we construct a counterfactual sample of firms. We identify firms that are not likely to be directly involved in production of subject products and were not subject to ongoing competition or trade policy investigation. Firms in our counterfactual sample have on average similar characteristics as firms in the treated sample, but do not report to be active in production of subject products or fabricated steel products, using subject products as intermediates. We have experimented with different random counterfactual samples of firms within different industries, obtaining similar results. In specification (4), we present randomly selected firms from the chemical sector, unlikely to be affected by US safeguards 34 . Interpreting the coefficient µ 2 in the last column of Table   3 , we can reject the hypothesis that mark-ups have declined in 2002 and 2003. Similar to our treated samples (1), (2), and (3) we find mark-ups to be statistically different from 1, implying imperfect competition in the European chemical industry. We can exclude the possibility that a decrease in mark-ups was driven by a common EU-15 industry effect.
Alternative Specification
To verify the results obtained with the Roeger specification, we discuss here an alternative estimation method. As our core alternative model we borrow a price-cost margin (PCM) approach discussed in Tybout (2003) . The empirical model is based upon a simple theoretical pricing model with imperfect competition, assuming static profit maximizing behavior of firms.
This approach is based upon the Lerner index, describing a profit maximizing firm's marginal costs (
Pit c it
) at time t as a decreasing function of the elasticity of demand (ε) that firm i faces when selling the output Q it at price P it , formally expressed as
with corresponding price mark-up µ it . The intuition implies that US safeguards affect its own protected market elasticity of demand in a negative manner and allow for higher price mark-ups. Price cost margin (P CM) can then be expressed as a function of output price (P it ), output (Q it ), 3 4 Firms within the steel sector are not considered as a control group due to following reasons. First, the steel industry accounted for about one third of all antidumping cases and has been subject to several antitrust investigations in the last decades. It is hard to disentangle the compound effect of different policies concerning basic and fabricated steel products. Secondly, basic steel subject to US safeguard protection in 2002, are likely to be employed in further processing downstream the production within industries like fabricated steel, machinery, tools, vehicles, and others. and marginal production costs (c it ):
We follow the common estimation approach discussed in Konings and Vandenbussche (2005) and use the observed firm level price-cost margin defined as sales net of expenditures on labour and materials over sales, i.e. P CM it = (PitQit−PMitMit−PLitLit) PitQit for firm i at year t. In order to verify the results in Table 3 , we estimate mark-ups of a pooled sample of firms, using the following regression equation:
where α i represents the unobserved firm specific fixed effects and ξ it a white noise error term. The regressions include controls on capital intensity (KI it ) for firm i at time t, defined as a ratio of capital to total assets, real GDP growth in country j at time t (GDP it ), a dummy Table 5 presents the results of the PCM model.
[Insert Table 5 here]
In the first three model specifications, we indicate a statistically highly significant decrease 
Conclusion
This paper studies the effects of safeguard measures on mark-ups of foreign firms. Using panel data on a large sample of European producers of subject products, we find that their mark-ups declined during 2002 and 2003. We identify that variation in export intensity and import penetration substantially contributed to this decline. This finding is consistent with our hypothesis that mark-ups are affected through cost and demand side. In addition, the responsiveness of price mark-ups is shown to be larger for more diversified than for less diversified firms. Controlling for unobservable firm heterogeneity with fixed effects, these results are robust to alternative specifications.
Did US safeguard protection decrease mark-ups of European steel producers? While our results indicate that US safeguard measures are associated with a decline in mark-ups of European firms, the magnitude of change likely reflects the compound effect of different ongoing antidumping and competition policies in the steel sector during that time. On one hand, markups associated with subject products exported to the US declined, implying that exporters partially absorbed the tariff that was imperfectly passed through to the US price. On the other hand, mark-ups were indirectly affected by increased elasticities of European demand for subject products due to import competition arising from deflected trade to the EU and third markets.
Changes in mark-ups are estimated at the lower-bound values. The effect of import penetration and trade diversion may have been stronger than revealed by our results. The effect on mark-ups depends upon firms' ability to deflect exports to third non-protected markets and demand elasticities they face in destination markets. Firms are heterogeneous and mark-up differentials amongst them are related to individual firm characteristics. In sum, we realize these extensions are important and add to our caution in interpreting the results. However, the negative effect of US safeguards on mark-ups of European firms is shown to be considerably large, suggesting that one country's safeguard protection may generate adverse externalities. This could imply that administered safeguard policies decrease market power of foreign producers and hence are to be considered jointly with antidumping and competition policies.
And the equilibrium in the EU is defined as:
This result shows that the European firm's market share will be lower in the US market than the US firm's market share in the European market. The US safeguard tariff shifts the best response function of the EU firm inwards in the US market. In fact, the US tariff diminishes the EU firm's market share in the US by more than it increases the US firm's market share in the US.
In equilibrium, the European firm will maintain its market share in the US as long as it will find it profitable to export. In other words, it needs to cover its costs per each unit of product sold in the US, so thatp * > c g + τ > 0 ∧σ * > 0. Analogously will the US firm export to the EU market as long as it gilts thatp > c g > 0 ∧σ > 0. Rewriting the equilibrium price levels in terms of demand elasticities and market shares, the elasticities of demand can be expressed as:
Furthermore, the EU firm will export to the US market as long as the tariff τ is set below its prohibitive level, i.e. as long asτ < c(ε
. This is an important implication of the model,
showing that the elasticity of demand in the US is lower than in the US due to the US safeguard tariff, i.e. ε * < ε . The adverse effect of the safeguard tariff on mark-ups of the European firm can be shown from the inverse relationship between price mark-ups and the price elasticity of a) Import share = US general import tonnes of subject products U S general import tonnes of all basic metal products b) All sub ject products include also a group of semi-finished products that were under US safeguard protection. This group includes most of sub ject tin-mill products, fittings and flanges. c) Import market share statistics were obtained at product-level. Notation N/A denotes data that were not available at product-level. We report aggregated statistics on import shares of hot-rolled, cold-finished and stainless steel bars. a) The first column presents total number of firms producing sub ject products. Percentages in brackets denote the presence of multi-product firms in other sectors. a) Robust standard errors are reported in Brackets. ***/**/* denote statistically significant at 1/5/10% confidence level.
b) All firms refer to affected firms producing products sub ject to the US safeguards.
c) Counterfactual firms refer to firms in the manufacturing sector that have on average similar characteristics as all affected firms, but were not sub ject to safeguard protection. a) Robust standard errors are reported in Brackets. ***/**/* denote statistically significant at 1/5/10% confidence level.
b) All firms refer to affected firms producing products sub ject to the US safeguards. a) Robust standard errors are reported in Brackets. ***/**/* denote statistically significant at 1/5/10% confidence level.
c) Counterfactual firms refer to firms in the manufacturing sector that have on average similar characteristics as all affected firms, but were not sub ject to safeguard protection. 
